[August 8, 1915] -
KILLING IN PULASKI.
J. H. Taylor Shoots Frank Summers in Election Quarrel.
Somerset, Ky., Aug 7. -- (Special.) -- The first trouble growing out of the political campaign in this county occurred last night at a public speaking at Bourbon. J. H. Taylor, a lawyer of this city, shot and killed Frank Summers, a farmer. Taylor was a supporter of Judge Bethurum, Republican candidate for Circuit Judge, and Summers was for Kennedy, Bethurum's opponent. Taylor gave himself up to the officers this morning and is in the county jail. 
[August 10, 1915] -
Killing in Pulaski.
At Bourbon precinct, Pulaski county, on Friday night, J. H. Taylor a Somerset attorney, shot and killed Frank Sumners, a farmer. It is stated that Sumners, who was for Kennedy for circuit judge, yelled for his man at a speaking which had been advertised by the Bethurum advocates. Taylor, a Bethurum follower, called him down and a quarrel ensued, in which the attorney used his gun with a fatal effect. Taylor gave himself up. He was taken to Danville till his trial. 
[August 10, 1915] -
In Pulaski county a fellow named Sumner was killed by a lawyer by the name of Taylor because the former yelled for his favorite in the circu[i]t judge's race. Down in Fulton county, near Sassafras Ridge, Oscar Allison cried out, "hurrah," for his man in the circuit judge's race and started a fight in which he was badly wounded and two other men were killed. From these tragedies one would conclude that it is dangerous to express a preference in judicial races, but the fact that Judge Hardin carried four out of four counties for circuit judge in this district shows that there are exceptions in all cases. 
[September 16, 1915] -
SOMERSET. -- With three recent murder cases and an unusually large amount of minor business to transact, the September circuit court has opened here with Judge B. J. Bethurum on the bench. One case is that of the killing of Frank Summer by J. H. Taylor, a local lawyer, during a political speaking the night before the recent primary election. 
[September 30, 1915] -
SOMERSET. -- Rendered ineligible to sit in the murder trial of Frank Taylor, local attorney, under indictment for killing a Bourbon precinct politician during a political speaking last August, Judge B. J. Bethurum will give up the bench during the trial of the case of Judge A. J. Kirk of Paintsville, Ky. 
[September 30, 1915] -
Special Judge Named.
Somerset, Ky., Sept. 29. -- Gov McCreary has designated Judge A. J. Kirk, of Paintsville, to try the case of Frank Taylor, charged with the murder of a farmer in the Bourbon district of this county following a political argument last August. Taylor at the time of the murder was speaking in behalf of the re-election of Judge B. J. Bethurum of this city. Judge Bethurum was present at the time of the killing and consequently was not eligible to sit in the trial. 
[February 18, 1916] -
CHANGE OF VENUE GRANTED
J. H. Taylor Trial to be Heard in Whitley.
Special to The Courier Journal.
Somerset, Ky., Feb. 17. -- The case of J. H. Taylor, charged with killing Frank Summer was called to-day, Judge B. J. Bethurum refused to sit in the case and the Governor appointed Judge Marshall as special Judge. The Commonwealth asked for a change of venue. Arguments and testimony were heard by Judge Marshall on the motion and he this afternoon granted the change of venue and the case will be tried in Whitley county at Williamsburg.
The killing took place during the campaign between Judge Bethurum and Judge Kennedy for the Republican nomination for Judge and only a few days before the election at a speaking in Bourbon precinct, and occurred while Judge Bethurum was speaking. Feeling at the time ran high. The Commonwealth has over 100 witnesses. The trial will begin next Monday. 
[February 22, 1916] -
Attorney Herbert Reynolds, of Eubank, who attended circuit court at Somerset last week, spent several days in Stanford the latter part of the week with Supt. G. Singleton and family. Mr. Reynolds says that the case of Taylor, charged with killing Summer, was called last week but Judge Bethurum, refused to sit in the case and the Governor appointed Judge Marshall as special judge. The Commonwealth asked for a change of venue and arguments were heard by Judge Marshall on the motion, and he granted the change. The case will be tried by Whitley county, at Williamsburg. The killing took place during the political campaign between Judge Bethurum and Judge Kennedy for the Republican nomination for Judge, and only a few days before the election. The shooting took place while Judge Bethurum was speaking. The Commonwealth has more than 100 witnesses. The trial began Monday. 
[March 5, 1916] -
LIFE SENTENCE FOR TAYLOR IN ELECTION KILLING CASE
Special to the Courier-Journal.
Williamsburg, Ky., March 4. -- J. H. Taylor was sentenced to life imprisonment to-day for the killing of Frank Sumner in Pulaski county shortly before last year's primary. The case was tried on change of venue to this county. The killing occurred at Bourbon schoolhouse during a speaking. 
[March 7, 1916] -
PULASKI MAN GETS LIFE.
J. H. Taylor was sentenced at Williamsburg for the killing of Frank Sumner in Pulaski county shortly before last year's primary. The case was tried on change of venue to Whitley county. The killing occurred at Bourbon schoolhouse during a speaking. 
[November 10, 1916] -
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Nov. 10, 1916.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Whitley County.
J. H. Taylor was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed and remanded.
*1088 W. R. Henry, of Williamsburg, and R. S. Rose, of Harlan, for appellant.
M. M. Logan, Atty. Gen., Overton S. Hogan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. B. Snyder, of Williamsburg, for the Commonwealth.
The appellant, J. H. Taylor, was tried in the Whitley circuit court under an indictment charging him with the murder of Frank Sumner. The jury by their verdict found him guilty of the crime charged, and fixed his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for life. This appeal is prosecuted by him from the judgment entered upon that verdict.
The killing occurred at night on August 6, 1915, at a colored schoolhouse near the city of Somerset in the county of Pulaski, and but a day or two before the primary election at which candidates for circuit judge, commonwealth's attorney, and perhaps other offices were nominated. Judge Bethurum and one Kennedy were contestants for the Republican nomination for the office of circuit judge. Appellant was a supporter of Bethurum and decedent of Kennedy. Bethurum was at the schoolhouse and made a speech on the occasion referred to, but his opponent, Kennedy, was absent. Speeches were also made by others at the meeting. Sumner seems to have been somewhat intoxicated, and was at times disorderly during the speaking, in announcing in a loud voice his preference of Kennedy in the race for nomination for circuit judge.
According to appellant's own testimony, while a colored orator was addressing the crowd he left his seat in the building, intending to go out into the yard, but upon getting just outside of the door stopped to hear an anecdote being related by the speaker. At that time the decedent was standing in or just outside of the door with his hands, or one of them, upon the frame of the door. Upon seeing appellant he said to him:
“You are the son of a b___ that wrote those lies on Judge Jasper and had them published in the Somerset paper.”
Jasper was then or had been county judge of Pulaski county, and the decedent was a tenant upon his farm. According to the further testimony of appellant, the decedent, in addition to the words stated, said to him, “Take your hand out of your pocket,” or “Don't place your hands about your pockets. I am not scared of you.” That the decedent then attempted to place his hand in one of his pockets and started toward him, whereupon he (appellant) drew his pistol and fired four shots at the decedent, only one of which entered the body of the decedent, who immediately fell and quickly died. It was admitted by the appellant on cross-examination that he carried to the speaking in his right front pants pocket the pistol with which the killing was done, and that when he left the schoolhouse and went out into the yard he had his hand in that pocket and upon the pistol. He claimed, however, that he shot the decedent because he thought he was in danger of death or great bodily harm at his hands.
Several of the witnesses introduced for the commonwealth testified that they heard the decedent charge appellant with the authorship of the publication attacking Judge Jasper, and some of them heard him tell appellant to take his hand from his pocket, that he was not afraid of him, but they all testified that, though the decedent removed his hands from the door framing, he did not *1089 put either of them in his pocket or attempt to do so at the time of the shooting, and that he made no attempt to advance upon the appellant. No weapon was found upon the person of the decedent. It also appears from the evidence that appellant was unacquainted with the decedent prior to the shooting.
 One of the grounds urged by the appellant for a reversal is that the trial court erred in changing the venue of the case from Pulaski to Whitley county. This complaint cannot be considered, as it appears from the record that appellant agreed to the change of venue. This is shown by the following order:
“This day came the commonwealth's attorney and produced and filed his petition, supported by affidavits of William Eller and G. P. Myers and others, all of which were noted of record, and moved the court for a change of venue in the above-styled prosecution to some county other than Pulaski or any county in the Twenty-Ninth judicial district, and the court being advised and defendant being present in court in person and by attorney and not objecting and agreeing thereto, it is ordered and adjudged that the above-styled cause be and the same is now transferred to Whitley county for trial, and the clerk of this court is ordered and directed to transmit all the original records in this prosecution, together with a copy of this order, to the clerk of the Whitley circuit court at once. * * *”
Obviously appellant cannot be permitted to repudiate the agreement thus made in open court.
 Appellant also complains that the court erred in permitting from the commonwealth, through certain witnesses introduced for that purpose, an attack upon his character for veracity. This complaint is also without merit. As appellant testified in his own behalf, the evidence of the commonwealth referred to, introduced in rebuttal, was properly admitted. In the recent case of Bennett v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 63, 186 S. W. 933, in passing upon the admissibility of such evidence, we said:
“Where the defendant in a criminal prosecution does not testify as a witness in the case, as allowed by section 223, Criminal Code, evidence attacking his veracity is not admissible; nor will evidence attacking his moral character be admissible when he has not testified as a witness, unless he has first introduced other witnesses to show his moral character to be good. Hansford v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 700 [186 S. W. 498]. Where, however, the defendant testifies as a witness in his own behalf, he is then to be treated as any other witness, and his general moral character, as well as his character for truth and veracity, may be put in issue--i. e., attacked--by the commonwealth, although particular acts, whether good or bad, cannot be proved. 2 Roberson's Ky. Crim. Law & Procedure, § 972; Trusty v. Commonwealth [41 S. W. 766] 19 Ky. Law Rep. 706; McDonald v. Commonwealth, 86 Ky. 10 [4 S. W. 687, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 230]; Lockard v. Commonwealth, 87 Ky. 201 [8 S. W. 266, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 102]; Pace v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 204 [12 S. W. 271, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 407]. As in this case appellant testified in his own behalf, the commonwealth was properly allowed to introduce in rebuttal for the sole purpose of impeaching and discrediting him as a witness, the evidence showing his bad moral character and want of veracity.”
The only inquiry made was as to the reputation of the appellant for truth and veracity in the community where he lived.
 Appellant also complains that the trial court should have granted him a continuance of the case. The record fails to show that he made a motion for a continuance, but does show that he announced himself ready for trial when the case was called. In the absence of a showing by the record that such a motion was made, and the grounds therefor, this complaint will not be considered.
 He also makes the complaint that the trial court erred in limiting the argument to the jury to 40 minutes on a side, but it appears from the record that this alleged error was first brought to the attention of the circuit court in the motion and grounds for a new trial, for which reason it could not have been considered by that court as an available ground for a new trial, and cannot be regarded by this court as a ground for reversing the judgment appealed from. In order for it to be available for either of these purposes the error, if committed as alleged, must have been excepted to by the accused at the time of its commission, which was not done. The record of the trial nowhere shows that the court placed any limit upon the argument, or that appellant asked for any given time to argue the case, or that he took an exception to any ruling of the court in the matter of limiting the argument or refusing further time for argument. For the above reasons the complaint will not be considered by us.
 What has been said of the complaint last mentioned applies with equal force to that of appellant in regard to a further alleged error of the trial court in permitting certain alleged improper remarks from counsel for the commonwealth in argument to the jury. As neither the language of the counsel objected to nor the ruling of the court in permitting it was objected or excepted to by appellant at the time it was made and the ruling of the court thereon given, but was brought to the attention of that court for the first time in the motion and grounds for a new trial, the complaint cannot now be considered by us.
It is further insisted for the appellant that the circuit court erred in permitting employed counsel to take charge of and conduct the trial and make the final and only argument for the commonwealth to the jury, instead of the commonwealth's attorney, who was present and able to do so. As the ruling of the court constituting this alleged error was not objected nor excepted to during the trial, and was first presented in the motion and grounds for a new trial, it cannot now be urged by appellant for a reversal of the judgment, and will not, therefore, be considered by us.
 Appellant's final complaint is that the court erred in instructing the jury, and in*1090 failing to give all the law of the case. Instruction No. 1 is as follows:
“If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, J. H. Taylor, in Pulaski county, Ky., and before the finding of the indictment in this case, unlawfully, willfully, feloniously, and with his malice aforethought shot, with a pistol, a deadly weapon, loaded with powder and leaden balls and other hard and explosive substances, at and killed the deceased, Frank Sumner, at a time when it was not necessary and was not believed by the defendant Taylor, in the exercise of a reasonable judgment, to be necessary to so shoot and kill the said Sumner in order to protect himself from death or some serious bodily harm, then you will find the defendant Taylor guilty of the crime of willful murder, as charged in the indictment, and fix his punishment at death or by confinement in the state penitentiary for life, in your discretion according to the proof.”
This instruction, in effect, erroneously authorized the jury to find appellant guilty of murder if they believed from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he unlawfully, willfully, feloniously, and with malice aforethought shot and killed the deceased, unless the killing was necessary and was believed by appellant in the exercise of a reasonable judgment to be necessary, in order to protect himself from death or serious bodily harm at the hands of deceased. In other words, it advised the jury that in order to excuse the killing upon the ground of self-defense, it was necessary for them to believe from the evidence not only that appellant in the exercise of a reasonable judgment believed it to be necessary to shoot and kill the deceased in order to protect himself from death or great bodily harm, but also that the necessity for the killing actually existed. It will be observed that the error in the instruction is caused by the use of the copulative conjunction “and” indicated in italics above when the disjunctive “or” should have been the word used. The instruction is in conflict with the law as held in this jurisdiction. Carnes v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky. 428, 142 S. W. 723; Potter v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 381, 134 S. W. 462; Austin v. Commonwealth, 91 S. W. 267, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1087; Deacon v. Commonwealth, 162 Ky. 196, 172 S. W. 121; Gordon v. Commonwealth, 136 Ky. 508, 124 S. W. 806; Keeton v. Commonwealth, 108 S. W. 315, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 1164.
 Instruction No. 2 is as follows:
“If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, J. H. Taylor, in Pulaski county and before the finding of the indictment in this case, unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously, but in sudden heat and passion and sudden affray, and without previous malice, shot with a pistol, a deadly weapon loaded with powder and leaden balls and other hard and explosive substances, at and killed the deceased, Frank Sumner, at a time when it was not necessary and was not believed by the defendant, Taylor, in the exercise of a reasonable judgment to be necessary to so shoot and kill the said Sumner in order to protect himself from death or some serious bodily harm, then you will find the defendant guilty of the crime of ‘voluntary manslaughter,’ included in the charge in the indictment, and fix his punishment at confinement in the state penitentiary for an indeterminate period of not less than 2 years, and not more than 21 years, and you will say in your verdict the shortest period and the longest period that he shall be required to serve.”
This instruction erroneously states the law in two particulars, first in advising the jury that in order to find appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter they must believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was done unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously, in sudden heat and passion and sudden affray, “at a time when it was not necessary and was not believed by the defendant, Taylor, in the exercise of a reasonable judgment to be necessary” in order to protect himself from death or serious bodily harm at the hands of deceased. It will be observed that the error in this instruction first mentioned consists in its requiring the jury, in order to reduce appellant's crime from murder to voluntary manslaughter, to believe that the killing must have been done both in sudden heat and passion and sudden affray, when if done either in sudden heat and passion or in a sudden affray, the killing constituted voluntary manslaughter, if not done by appellant in his necessary or apparently necessary self-defense.
 The second error is the same that appears in instruction No. 1, previously referred to, and arises out of the use of the word “and” when “or” should have been the word employed. It has been more than once held in this jurisdiction that where an apt and proper instruction on self-defense is given it is not error to omit from an instruction defining murder or voluntary manslaughter the qualifying statement as to the law of self-defense attempted to be set forth in instructions 1 and 2 in this case. Miller v. Commonwealth, 163 Ky. 246, 173 S. W. 761; Catron v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 61, 130 S. W. 951; Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 152 Ky. 805, 154 S. W. 919. But where the phrase is as here inserted in such erroneous language as to conflict with the law contained in a separate instruction on the right of self-defense and by reason thereof calculated to mislead the jury, it constitutes error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant. In view of the peculiar facts of this case instruction No. 2 should have advised the jury what would constitute such provocation as would be reasonably calculated to produce sudden heat of passion in the appellant. According to the testimony of the appellant, he was assailed by the deceased with a very offensive epithet, denounced for writing and publishing lies on Judge Jasper, offensively commanded to take his hands out of his pockets, and told that deceased was not afraid of him. As this testimony, together with that of appellant that the deceased advanced upon him with his hand in his pocket, all properly went to and was considered by the jury, they should, we think, have been permitted to determine, under a proper instruction, whether, under the circumstances, they constituted *1091 such provocation as would adequately negative malice and reduce the homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter, and the failure of the court to give such an instruction was prejudicial error.
 The instructions, other than those above referred to, are not objected to by appellant, but the judgment appealed from must be reversed on account of the errors indicated in instructions 1 and 2, in view of which and the difficulty under which the trial court seemed to have labored in stating the law on the former trial, we direct the giving on another trial of the following instructions:
(1) If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, J. H. Taylor, in Pulaski county, and before the finding of the indictment, did willfully, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought, not in his necessary or reasonably apparent necessary self-defense, shoot and kill Frank Sumner, you should find him guilty of willful murder as charged in the indictment, and fix his punishment at death or at confinement in the state penitentiary for life, in your discretion.
(2) Or if you shall not believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, J. H. Taylor, has been proven guilty of murder as defined in instruction No. 1 above, but shall believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he did, in Pulaski county, and before the finding of the indictment, without previous malice and not in his necessary or reasonably apparent necessary self-defense, but in a sudden affray or in sudden heat and passion, upon a provocation reasonably calculated to excite his passions beyond the power of his control, shoot and kill Frank Sumner, you should in that event find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter and fix his punishment at confinement in the state penitentiary for an indeterminate period of not less than 2 years nor more than 21 years, and state in your verdict the minimum and maximum period that he shall be so confined.
(3) If you shall believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has been proven guilty either of willful murder, as defined by instruction No. 1 above, or of voluntary manslaughter, as defined by instruction No. 2 above, but shall have a reasonable doubt from all the evidence as to whether the defendant be guilty of willful murder or of voluntary manslaughter, then it will be your duty to find him guilty of the lower offense, voluntary manslaughter.
(4) The words “willful” and “willfully,” as used in these instructions, mean intentional, not accidental or voluntary. The word “feloniously,” as used in these instructions, means proceeding from an evil heart or purpose, done with a deliberate intention of committing a crime. The words “malice aforethought,” as used in these instructions, mean a predetermination to commit the act of killing without legal excuse, and it is immaterial at what time before the killing such a determination was formed.
(5) If you believe from the evidence that at the time the defendant, J. H. Taylor, shot and killed Frank Sumner, if he did so do, he believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that he was then and there in immediate danger of death or the infliction of some great bodily harm at the hands of Sumner, and that it was necessary or was believed by the defendant in the exercise of a reasonable judgment to be necessary to so shoot and wound the deceased in order to avert that danger, real or to the defendant apparent, then you ought to acquit the defendant upon the ground of self-defense or apparent necessity therefor.
(6) The law presumes the defendant innocent until his guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and if upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt from all of the evidence of the defendant having been proven guilty by the evidence, then you ought to find him not guilty.
Because of error in the instructions, the judgment is reversed and cause remanded for a new trial consistent with the opinion. 
[November 11, 1916] -
New Trial Granted.
J. H. Taylor, who killed Frank Sumner, at a negro Republican rally near Somerset on the eve of the August primary in 1915, will get a new trial; because the Whitley Circuit Court erroneously charged the jury in his prejudice in regard to self-defense, which was Taylor's plea. He was sentenced for life. 
[November 16, 1916] -
The misuse of the word "and" in the instructions given by the Whitley Circuit Court in the trial of J. H. Taylor, convicted of the murder of Frank Sumner may save Taylor from serving a life sentence in the penitentiary. The fight, which resulted in Sumner's death, took place at a political meeting in Pulaski County in 1915. The Court instructed the jury that unless it believed that Taylor thought that it was necessary and believed that Taylor thought that it was necessary to kill Sumner to save his life then he should be found guilty. The Court says that the word "and" should not have been used in this connection, and therefore ordered a new trial for Taylor. 
--- --- ---
[The above Court of Appeals opinion states that Sumner said to Taylor, “You are the son of a b___ that wrote those lies on Judge Jasper and had them published in the Somerset paper.” Below is the article Sumner was likely referring to.]
[July 30, 1915] -
JASPER-KENNEDY GANG EXPOSED
TO THE REPUBLICANS:--
Judge Jasper is so weak intellectually and his knowledge of the law so limited that he does not even know the difference between a preliminary order and a final judgement. If any doubts what I say, I refer him to the case styled: Crow vs. Taylor" It may be he knows better but has no respect for the law, absolutely no regards for the rights and liberties of his fellow citizens. But view it from whichever light of reasoning you perfer for I know that upon an investigation of the records that you will be honor-bound to accept either one or the other of the two conclusions. If it is the former that ails the Judge then we must all concur in the opinion that he is wholly unfit, unqualified and incompetent for the position which he now occupies at the hands of the intelligent citizenship of this great county. But if it is the latter with which he is tinged--absolutely ignoring the law--and is so corrupt and partial that he even laughs at reason and the plain provisions of the law and hands down decisions in accordance with his own weak, pusillanimous ideas, notions and theories, then, it is doing an injury to the word to call him Judge.
This is the very same gentleman that is going over the district telling, suggesting and advising the people how to vote. Do you believe, fellow-citizens, according to the above which is as true as is the magnetic needle to the North pole that the Judge is free from bias and prejudice, is intelligence, sensible, and well enough informed to safely advise the good, honest people of this great district how to vote.
He is saying in his speeches all over the district that whisky is being sold in Somerset, Pulaski county, by bootleggers and otherwise is open daylight in a local option town, and in open, flagrant violation of the law. Now let us reason just a bit, and by so doing we can very readily see the predicament in which the Judge has gotten himself. I am sorry for this gentlemen for it has been said that "A little knowledge is a very dangerous thing." He says that he knows whereof he speaks. Is he not the Judge of the county and what is his duties as such and what is the nature and substance of the oath that he was required to make upon the assumption of the duties of said office?
He pledge his conscience to his God and to his people under his official oath that he would do all that is in him to enforce the laws in every nook and corner of this county. According to his own statement, his own confession, he has violated his oath of office and stands at the Bar of Public Opinion guilty of the awful crime of perjury. But he tries to justify himself by saying that such violators of the law laugh at him and even spit scorn and contempt in his face and threaten an appeal to the Circuit Court. "The sheltering and protecting rendezvous of criminals of all type caliber and character." This is a very grave reflection upon the honesty and integrity of our Circuit Judge, who is the very embodiment of justice and who stands for the strict and rigid enforcement of the laws. This is a very weak, flimsy excuse on the part of Jasper. He can not shift the responsibility. If he has told the truth the sin lies at his own door. But before God I would rather be a spot on a jaybird's tail than to confess that I was helpless and unable to stand by the good people of the county, enforcing the laws both motely and remotely within the confines of my jurisdiction.
Why is Jasper supporting Kennedy in this race? Because he knows that if Kennedy is elected that he and Kennedy will go hand in hand, like the two Siamean twins having two heads and four arms, and that if you undertake to detach one from the other you subject them both to a miserable and lingering destruction. If Kennedy is elected (but of course he is not going to be) he will be Judge of both the County and Circuit Court. Jasper will be his puppet and as helpless under his influence as that of a bird under the charming spell of the snake. And then think of Kennedy's legal advisers, Lord have mercy on their souls! With this gang dictating and controlling the courts what chance, pray tell me, would the common people have? In trickery, in bossism in political corruption, it would have no equal in the history of the world. Kennedy has been to the Republican party of this district what Catilline was to Rome; what Brutus was to Caesar; what Judas was to Christ, the Savior of humanity. It will be a calamity to humanity, a blemish upon the face of justice and honesty, a badge of eternal infamy upon the fair name of this district to elect such a character to the highest and most important office at the hands of our people.
I am a young lawyer, and have just recently located here in the good town of Somerset and have practiced law before both Jasper and Judge Bethurum and I am writing this article voluntarily and upon my own volition.
Fellow-citizens and voters give this matter your careful consideration and go to your respective voting places on August 7th and vote accordingly.
J. H. TAYLOR Adv. 
 "Killing in Pulaski." The Courier Journal, Louisville, KY. August 8, 1915. Page 1. Newspapers.com.
 "Killing in Pulaski." The Courier Journal, Louisville, KY. August 8, 1915. Page 1. Newspapers.com.
 "Killing in Pulaski." The Interior Journal, Stanford, KY. August 10, 1915. Page 1. LOC. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85052023/1915-08-10/ed-1/seq-1/
 The Interior Journal, Stanford, KY. August 10, 1915. Page 2. LOC. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85052023/1915-08-10/ed-1/seq-2/
 Excerpt from "News of Kentucky." Lexington Leader, Lexington, KY. September 16, 1915. Page 9. Genealogybank.com.
 Excerpt from "News of Kentucky." Lexington Leader, Lexington, KY. September 30, 1915. Page 5. Genealogybank.com.
 Excerpt from Column 1. The Courier Journal, Louisville, KY. September 30, 1915. Newspapers.com.
 "Change of Venue Granted." The Courier Journal, Louisville, KY. February 18, 1916. Page 3. Newspapers.com.
 "Murder Cases to Whitley." The Interior Journal, Stanford, KY. February 22, 1916. Page 1. LOC. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85052023/1916-02-22/ed-1/seq-1/
 "Life Sentence for Taylor in Election Killing Case." The Courier Journal, Louisville, KY. March 5, 1916. Page 11. Newspapers.com.
 "Pulaski Man Gets Life." The Interior Journal, Stanford, KY. March 7, 1916. Page 1. LOC. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85052023/1916-03-07/ed-1/seq-1/
 Taylor v. Commonwealth, 172 Ky. 136, 188 S.W. 1087 (1916).
 "New Trial Granted." The Courier Journal, Louisville, KY. November 11, 1916. Page 3. Newspapers.com.
 Excerpt from "Kentucky News." The Central Record, Lancaster, KY. November 16, 1916. Page 7. LOC. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn86069201/1916-11-16/ed-1/seq-7/
 "Jasper-Kennedy Gang Exposed." Mount Vernon Signal, Mt. Vernon, KY. July 30, 1915. Page 1. LOC. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn86069561/1915-07-30/ed-1/seq-1/